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Stomaching the Burden of Dietary Supplement Safety:
The Need to Shift the Burden of Proof Under the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
Morgan J. Wais*
There are some in the industry that would have us accept
the notion that ephedra is only an outlier. That the law is
sound and only this single substance needs to be banned. I
do not believe that that is the truth, and I believe they know
better. I
-Rep. John D. Dingell
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, more than half of all Americans consume die-
tary supplements in some form, be it in a pill, bar, powder, or liquid.2
Americans consume dietary supplements for various reasons-to lose
weight, to build muscle, to have more energy, to treat colds, or simply to
live a healthier life.3 In the latter half of the twentieth century,
"[s]kyrocketing healthcare costs, longer life expectancy, perceived fail-
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1. Issues Relating to Ephedra-Containing Dietary Supplements, Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) [hereinafter Ephedra
Hearings] (opening statements of Rep. John D. Dingell, ranking member of the Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/action/108-43.pdf (last
visited Mar. 13, 2005).
2. Id. (testimony of Mark B. McClellan M.D., Ph.D).
3. Lauren J. Sloane, Herbal Garden of Good and Evil: The Ongoing Struggles of Dietary Sup-
plement Regulation, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 324 (1999); see also Jeffery A. Crossman, Mark
McGwire Does It, So Why Can't I? High School Student Use of Dietary Supplements and the Failure
of DSHEA, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 617, 623-24 (2000).
849
Seattle University Law Review
ure of Western trained doctors to practice preventative medicine, lack of
effective communication with patients, and new diseases all contributed"
to Americans seeking alternative medical treatments.4 Not wanting the
sales of dietary supplements to be wholly unregulated, Congress passed
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 ("DSHEA").5
Although DSHEA made several substantial changes to dietary supple-
ment regulation, it also created a great deal of uncertainty about the
scope of the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") regulatory power
over dietary supplements. Such uncertainty is due in large part to three
characteristics: (1) DSHEA contains ambiguous verbiage; (2) DSHEA
divested the United States government of a large portion of its regulatory
power, and, above all; (3) DSHEA placed the burden of proving dietary
supplement safety on the FDA, rather than on the dietary supplement
industry.6
Although this Comment concerns dietary supplements in general, it
focuses on ephedra because of its recent rise in popularity and its subse-
quent fall due to safety concerns.7 Ephedra regulation illustrates many of
the deficiencies of supplement regulation under DSHEA. However, sim-
ply addressing a single dangerous dietary supplement does not provide a
long-term solution for the underlying problems endemic in current sup-
plement regulation. 8 Accordingly, changes made to provisions of
DSHEA have to be broad and sweeping rather than narrow and limited to
ephedra.
In order to best protect consumers, Congress should amend DSHEA
so that the burden of proving the safety of dietary supplements rests
solely on the dietary supplement industry, rather than on the FDA. De-
spite countless injuries to supplement users, the current regulatory
scheme under DSHEA has not encouraged the FDA to make the safety
determinations necessary to meet its burden and properly regulate the
4. Teresa Schroeder, Chinese Regulation of Traditional Chinese Medicine in the Modern
World. Can the Chinese Effectively Profit from One of Their Most Valuable Cultural Resources? II
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 687, 692 (2002).
5. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, §§ 301 et seq.,
108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
6. See Robert G. Pinco, Paul D. Rubin, Ambiguities of the Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act of 1994, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 383 (1996).
7. See Jennifer Sardina, Misconceptions and Misleading Information Prevail-Less Regulation
Does Not Mean Less Danger to Consumers: Dangerous Herbal Weight Loss Products, 14 J.L. &
HEALTH 107, 117 (1999-2000).
8. Before ephedra, the dietary supplement of choice was fen-phen. Fen-phen has since been
voluntarily pulled from the market by manufacturers because of its numerous dangerous side effects,
which are similar to those ofephedra. See id. at 125-26.
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dietary supplement industry. 9 It has, therefore, become the injured public
who has held dietary supplement manufacturers accountable when they
produce an unsafe product.' 0 And it will be the public that will continue
to be injured until pre-market approval is required of dietary supple-
ments.
If Congress amends DSHEA and places the burden of proving the
safety of dietary supplements on the industry, supplement manufacturers
of products that are truly safe will be little more than inconvenienced. To
illustrate, manufacturers of vitamin C have little to be concerned about,
as there is undeniable evidence proving not only vitamin C's safety, but
also its benefits." However, ephedra and other dangerous dietary sup-
plements not only lack proven benefits, but have several known deleteri-
ous effects. Manufacturers of ephedra would have to establish its safety
before marketing their products. As the law currently stands, even prod-
ucts like ephedra that are ultimately banned12 are allowed to remain on
the market far too long once their deleterious effects are known, resulting
in innumerable unnecessary injuries.13
Part II of this Comment will give a brief historical perspective on
dietary supplement regulation and discuss the evolution of drug regula-
tion by the FDA. Part I will conclude with a discussion of the political
environment in which these regulations occur. Part III will give examples
and show how the current system has caused injury and harm to consum-
ers of dietary supplements. Part IV will discuss the current burden of
proof and how it was applied in the case of ephedra. Part V will discuss
how, under the current regulatory structure, consumers cannot be ade-
quately protected, either by the FDA or the tort system. Part VI discusses
9. H.R. Res. 435, 108th Cong. (2003) (stating that "approximately 30 members of the United
States Army have died after taking dietary supplement containing ephedrine alkaloid").
10. Eric M. Kraus & Caroline E. Oh, Herbal Remedies and Dietary Supplements: Surveying
the Landscape of Litigation Trends, 4 No. 9 ANDREWS DRUG RECALL LITIG. REP. 11, at 1 (2001)
("As complaints mount, even seemingly modest problems can trigger the appetite of an ever-hungry
plaintiffs' bar for new and relatively untapped litigation targets.").
11. See News Release, Nat'l Inst. of Health, NIH Study Suggests Women May Need More
Vitamin C (Aug. 13, 2001), at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug200l/niddk-13.htm (last visited Nov.
13, 2004) [hereinafter NIH News Release]; see also Randy Dotinga, Vitamin C May Screen Second-
hand Smoke, HEALTH DAY REP., August 6, 2003, available at http://www.hon.ch/News/HSN
/514516.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004); Prominent Nutrition Experts Convene to Examine New
Benefits of Antioxidant Vitamins C and E, PR NEWSWIRE, May 29, 2003, available at http://
archives.foodsafetynetwork.ca/ffnetI2003/5-2003/functionalfoodnet may-29.htm#PROMINENT
(last visited Nov. 18, 2004) ("[SIcientific evidence already indicates that vitamins C and E can pro-
vide a benefit for people affected by conditions like diabetes and cardiovascular disease ....").
12. FDA Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedra Alkaloids Adulterated
Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788 (Feb. 11, 2004) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 119) [hereinafter FDA Rule Banning Ephedra].
13. See Bruce H. Schindler, Where There's Smoke There's Fire: The Dangers of the Unregu-
lated Dietary Supplement Industry, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 261, 278 (1998).
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the benefits that would likely be derived from shifting the burden of
proving safety onto the dietary supplement industry. Finally, Part VII
concludes this Comment.
II. HISTORY OF DSHEA, DRUG REGULATION, MONEY, AND POLITICS
A. Historical Basis and Formation of the Act
DSHEA was signed into law on October 25, 1994, by President
Clinton,' 4 but the history of regulating dietary supplements extends back
much farther.' 5 Regulation of supplements began when the FDA was
created in 1906 by the passage of the Pure Food Act ("PFA"). 16 The ini-
tial goals of Congress were to protect the public and to guard against de-
ceptive labeling practices regarding claims made by the manufacturers. 7
PFA was deficient because it gave the FDA only the power to remove
dangerous products from the market but did not give it the power to pre-
vent the products from entering the market in the first place.' 8
In 1938, Congress amended PFA and enacted the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 19 which gave the FDA the power to not only
remove dangerous products from the market, but also to require pre-
market approval from the FDA before certain products were placed on
the market.20 The FDCA also made the distinction between dietary foods,
which were to be regulated as food, and dietary ingredients, which were
to be regulated as drugs.2' Dietary foods were presumed safe and the
FDA had the burden of proving that the product was not safe, but the
burden of proving the safety of dietary ingredients rested upon the manu-
facturers. 22 At that time, most modem dietary supplements were classi-
fied as dietary ingredients, 23 and thus, like drugs, the burden of proving
product safety rested on the manufacturers.24
14. Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2004)).
15. See Schindler, supra note 13, at 262-72.
16. Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
17. Crossman, supra note 3, at 639.
18. Id.
19. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub L. No 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 301) (1938).
20. See id; see also Pinco & Rubin, supra note 6, at 385 ("The FDA historically has used its
food additive jurisdiction to prohibit marketing multiple ingredient dietary supplement products.
Because the FDA has pre-market approval authority over food additives, the characterization of a
dietary supplement ingredient as an unapproved food additive has enabled the agency to lawfully
challenge the marketing of a supplement that contains such an ingredient.").
21. Pinco & Rubin, supra note 6, at 385.
22. Id.
23. See generally Crossman, supra note 3, at 639-40; Schindler, supra note 13, at 268.
24. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675.
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Throughout the 1960s and until the early 1990s, there were frequent
discussions regarding the regulation and classification of dietary ingredi-
ents to allow them to be more easily brought to market. 25 Both sides were
strong advocates for their positions: One side sought tighter control of
dietary ingredients while the other sought a less burdensome approval
26process. Despite the urging of both dietary supplement manufacturers
and the public, the classification remained, and the burden of proving the
safety of the dietary ingredients remained on the manufacturers.2 7
This complex framework-what product falls into which category
for the sake of proving its safety-was reworked in 1994 when the
FDCA was amended with the passage of DSHEA.2 8 In passing DSHEA,
Congress sought "to supersede the current ad hoc, patch work regulatory
policy on dietary supplements." 29 In doing so Congress made several
findings, including the following: (1) the availability of dietary supple-
ments improves "the health status of United States citizens [,],, 30 (2) the
availability of dietary supplements allows consumers to be "empowered
to make choices about preventative health care programs based on data
from scientific studies of health benefits related to particular dietary sup-
plements,"'', and (3) "the nutritional supplement industry is an integral
part of the economy of the United States. 32 Most significant was Con-
gress' finding that "although the Federal Government should take swift
action against products that are unsafe or adulterated, the Federal Gov-
ernment should not take any actions to impose unreasonable regulatory
barriers limiting or slowing the flow of safe products and accurate infor-
mation to consumers." 33
DSHEA changed the regulation of dietary supplements in four main
ways. First, the Act defined dietary supplements as products supplement-
ing the diet that contain a vitamin, mineral, herb or other botanical,
amino acid, "dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by
increasing the total dietary intake," or "a concentrate, metabolite, con-
stituent, extract, or combination of any ingredient" described above. 34
25. Crossman, supra note 3, at 640.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2004).
29. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(15)(B),
108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
30. Id. at § 2(1).
31. Id. at § 2(8).
32. Id. at § 2(12)(A).
33. Id. at § 2(13).
34.21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(l) (2004).
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The new definition was an attempt to clarify the blurry line between
foods, dietary supplements, and pharmaceuticals.
35
Not only did the redefinition of dietary ingredients to dietary sup-
plements place supplements in the same regulatory framework as food,
but the new framework did not require supplement manufacturers to keep
accurate records of all adverse reactions reported to them from use of a
specific supplement. 36 Under the new definition, dietary supplement
manufacturers could put the product on the market and disregard any
complaints or questions regarding the safety of their product. 37 Compare
this framework to that of pharmaceuticals, where, among other things,
companies must keep accurate records of all adverse reactions reported
to them. 38
The second primary way in which DSHEA changed regulation of
dietary supplements was that DSHEA created the Office of Dietary Sup-
plements ("ODS") within the National Institute of Health, 39 a sub-agency
of the FDA. The ODS was created, in part, to make determinations about
the safety of certain dietary supplements. The stated purpose of ODS in
DSHEA was "to explore more fully the potential role of dietary supple-
ment as a significant part of the efforts of the United States to improve
health care ' 40 and "to promote scientific study of the benefits of dietary
supplements in maintaining health . . . .,,4 To effectuate this purpose,
ODS's role was narrowed to researching and substantiating claims made
42by dietary supplement companies. However, from its very inception,
ODS has not had the staffing and the funding to sufficiently research
products whose safety may be questionable, as discussed below.43
35. Many pharmaceuticals on the market today were originally derived from some kind of food
or plant. The same is true of dietary supplements. The difference between the two is merely how
well-refined the food or plant is. For instance, ephedra is derived from the ma huang plant, which
has been used in Chinese medicine for centuries. Its synthetic alternative, ephedrine, from which
pseudophedrine and norpsuedoephedrine are derived, differs very little from ephedra other than that
it is an approved pharmaceutical. Despite their different origins, both ephedrine and ephedra are
classified as ephedrine alkaloids. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., HHS Acts to Re-
duce Potential Risks of Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedra (Feb. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00875.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter FDA Press Release].
36.21 U.S.C. § 321.
37. See id.
38. Steven M. Kohn & Courtney E. Quinn, Dietary Supplements and the Playing Field, 69
DEF. CouNs. J. 517, 520 (2002).
39.42 U.S.C. § 287c-1 I(a) (2004).
40. § 287c- II(b)(1).
41. § 287c-1 l(b)(2).
42. § 287c-I I(c).
43. See infra Part V.A. See also Sloane, supra note 3, at 329.
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Third, DSHEA changed the way dietary supplements could be la-
beled and marketed. 4 Under DSHEA, dietary supplement manufacturers
could only make a statement that has "substantiation that such statement
is truthful and not misleading . . . ,45 Although the Act allows dietary
supplement manufacturers to make claims as to a likely benefit that
could be derived from the consumption of a particular supplement, the
Act does not allow claims that a supplement was supposed "to diagnose,
mitigate, treat, cure, or prevent a specific disease or class of diseases. ' 46
The FDA shares its labeling regulatory authority with the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC").a7 Thus, many of the concerns about FDA regula-
tion also apply to the FTC; most notably, that the burden remains on the
FDA and the FTC to prove certain claims rather than on the supplement
companies to prove the safety of their products.4 8
Finally, and the primary focus of this Comment, DSHEA placed the
burden of proving the safety of the dietary supplements on the FDA.4 9
Indeed, the first and the last ways in which DSHEA changed regulation
of supplements have a corollary relationship: The way in which a dietary
supplement was defined was directly connected to whether or not the
supplement manufacturer had the burden of proving the product's safety.
B. Pharmaceutical Regulation
While the history of pharmaceutical regulation does somewhat re-
semble the history of dietary supplement regulation, pharmaceutical
regulation evolved much more in response to pointed shortcomings in the
44. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2004).
45. § 343(r)(6)(B).
46. § 343(r)(6)(c).
47. See Crossman, supra note 3, at 644-45.
The FDA is not the only government entity charged with monitoring the dietary supple-
ment industry. Using its general authority to monitor "unfair or deceptive ... [trade] acts
or practices," the Federal Trade Commission . . . attempts to reign in the industry by
monitoring the health claims manufacturers and retailers are making in the advertising of
their dietary supplements .... The FTC requires that advertisers and advertising agencies
have a "reasonable basis" for claims they make before they are published.
Id; see also Ephedra Hearings, supra note I, at 236 (testimony of Mark B. McClellan M.D., Ph.D.)
("With a mutual goal of consumer protection, FDA and FTC formed a Dietary Supplement En-
forcement Group to closely coordinate their enforcement efforts against health care fraud.").
48. See Ephedra Hearings, supra note 1, at 236; see also 21 U.S.C. § 342(f). It is a lesser bur-
den to prove that the labeling claims are not substantiated than the burden of proving that a specific
dietary supplement presents a "significant or unreasonable risk." Not coincidently, attorneys have
used these same mislabeling claims in civil actions against dietary supplement manufacturers, as
discussed infra part V.B.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1). In the instance of "new dietary ingredients," the burden of proving
the safety of a dietary supplement was on the manufacturer only in the instances of a new dietary
ingredient. A new dietary ingredient was defined as "a dietary ingredient that was not marketed in
the United States before October 15, 1994." Id. § 350b(c).
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law-shortcomings that lead to the injuries and deaths of numerous
pharmaceutical consumers. 50 Like supplements, pharmaceuticals were
classified and loosely regulated by the FDA following the passage of the
Pure Food Act of 1906.51 At the time, PFA did many of the same things
for pharmaceutical regulation as DSHEA now does for dietary supple-
ment regulation. 52 Namely, PFA mandated that drug labeling be "truth-
ful," that drug manufacturers monitor product potency and quality, and
that the FDA be required to show "that a drug's labeling was false and
fraudulent before it could be taken off the market., 53 However, this regu-
latory framework soon proved insufficient.
"Elixir Sulfanilamide" entered the market in 1937 as an untested
tonic that was supposed to treat the common sore throat.54 However,
when consumers ingested the solution their bodies converted it into a
deadly poison that destroyed their kidneys.55 Shortly after the tragic
deaths of 107 individuals, most of whom were children, Congress passed
the FDCA.56
Prior to passage of the FDCA, drugs like Elixir Sulfanilamide en-
tered the market in precisely the same way as modem dietary supple-
ments, without pre-market approval from the FDA.57 The FDCA changed
this by requiring drug manufacturers to obtain approval from the FDA
before marketing any drugs or pharmaceuticals. 58 The FDCA also re-
quired drug manufacturers to submit a New Drug Application ("NDA")to the FDA, in which the FDA would determine whether the benefits of
50. See Schindler, supra note 13, at 262-67.
51. See Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
52. See Schindler, supra note 13, at 263; see also Sidney M. Wolfe, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COMMENTS ON THE HHS INSPECTOR GENERAL'S
STUDY OF ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING FOR DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS 86-87 (2001), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01 -00-001 80.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
[T]he FDA relies on DSHEA authority to declare ingredients adulterated if they present
"a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury." This after-the-fact form of regula-
tion is painfully reminiscent of the situation for prescription drugs before 1938. In that
earlier era FDA authority to take action against a drug could only occur after the agency
bore the burden of showing, based on marketing experience, that the drug's risks were
unacceptable rather than the post-1938 requirement of placing the burden for establishing
safety on the manufacturer.
Id.
53. See Pure Food Act, ch. 3915.
54. Nancy E. Pit, Regulation of the Export of Pharmaceuticals to Developing Countries, 25
DUQ. L. REV. 255, 259-60 (1987).
55. Id.
56. See BENEFIT VS. RISK: HOW CDER APPROVES NEW DRUGS 2, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-5.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
57. See id.
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2004).
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the drug outweighed any potential risks. 59 At this point, however, drug
manufacturers still did not have to prove that their product was effective
for its intended use upon undertaking clinical testing on humans.60
The regulatory shortcomings of the FDCA became apparent when,
in the early 1960s, thousands of malformed babies were born after their
mothers consumed the experimental drug Thalidomide. 61 The drug was
developed to quell nausea during pregnancy, though its effect on the de-
veloping child could not be determined until it was too late.62
Responding to the Thalidomide tragedy, in 1962 Congress passed
the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the FDCA, which required far more
extensive pre-market testing requirements. 63 Among the requirements of
the Kefauver-Harris Amendments was the requirement that drug manu-
facturers conduct "adequate and well-controlled" clinical testing on hu-
mans. 64 Moreover, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments required that manu-
facturers submit an application to begin clinical testing whenever they
test an Investigational New Drug ("IND") on humans.65 Notably, the Ke-
fauver-Harris Amendments also required drug manufacturers to send all
adverse reaction reports to the FDA.66
Currently, the procedure for obtaining pre-market approval for a
drug is extremely burdensome for pharmaceutical manufacturers.67 Even
before manufacturers submit an IND, the drug must undergo extensive
laboratory and animal testing.68 Looking at all the available information
on the drug, an FDA review board must authorize the drug for human
testing.69 Once approved for human testing, the drug manufacturer must
complete three phases of research on the IND.7 ° Phase I is conducted ona small sample of individuals to determine what dosage, if any, of the
59. See BENEFIT VS. RISK: How CDER APPROVES NEW DRUGS, supra note 56, at 3.
60. See Schindler, supra note 13, at 263-64.
61. BENEFIT VS. RISK: How CDER APPROVES NEW DRUGS, supra note 56, at 5.
62. Pirt, supra note 54, at 260-61.
63. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 332, 348, 351-353, 355, 357, 358-360, 372, 374, 376, 381
(2004)).
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. See also BENEFIT VS. RISK: How CDER APPROVES NEW DRUGS, supra note 56, at 5. It
should again be noted that DSHEA does not require dietary supplement manufacturers to report
adverse reactions to the FDA. Accordingly, the FDA is not able to gather information in an efficient
and timely manner as it is able to with drugs. This, in turn, has led to a slower process in removing
dangerous dietary supplements from the market because the nature and scope of their danger is not
recorded or reported by any party.
67. See Schindler, supra note 13, at 267.
68. See BENEFIT VS. RISK: How CDER APPROVES NEW DRUGS, supra note 56, at 7.
69. Schindler, supra note 13, at 265.
70. Id. at 265-66.
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drug is safe. 71 Phase II is conducted on a larger group of people, usually
several hundred, and its purpose is to determine the effectiveness of the
drug on the particular condition it was intended to treat. 72 Phase IIl usu-
ally involves several hundred to several thousand people and can last one
to four years.73 During phase lII, safety, proper dosage, and effectiveness
of the IND are all scrutinized. 74 The NDA will be approved only if it sat-
isfies the FDA at every step along the way. 75 But even after the drug is
placed on the market, the FDA continues to closely scrutinize the drug
until the FDA is absolutely satisfied of its safety; if it becomes concerned
about the safety of the drug, the FDA may immediately remove the drug
from the market.76 The drug approval process often takes well over ten
years, with the average cost to develop a new drug ranging from $300
million to $800 million.77
While it is true that when Congress enacted DSHEA, it did not in-
tend to put such a costly and time-consuming burden upon the dietary
supplement industry, the potential of injury from dangerous dietary sup-
plements may now necessitate it.78 Like Elixir Sulfanilamide and Tha-
lidomide, the problems caused by ephedra should signal to Congress that
a significant change is needed.
C. Ephedra Is Not the Only Dangerous Dietary Supplement
Ephedra is not the only dietary supplement that should give both
Congress and the FDA cause for concern. Prior to the explosive growth
of dietary supplements containing ephedra there was Gamma-Hydroxy
Butyrate ("GHB"), and prior to that there was L-tryptophan. 79 Thus,
ephedra is not a unique phenomenon and the underlying problem will not
71. Id.
72. Id. at 266.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 66-67; see also How Much Should Medicare Pay for Drugs?,
http://www.medscape.com/content/2004/0O/46/62/466262/466262_ref.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2004) (indicating that developing a new drug can cost a manufacturer as much as $800 million); M.
June Casalmir & Bernard Rhee, Pfizer/Pharmacia Merger-The Biggest Just Got Bigger, available
at http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00968/008887 (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
78. FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12.
79. Joshua Beisler, Note, Dietary Supplements and Their Discontents: FDA Regulation and the
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 511, 527-42 (2000). The
FDA recalled L-tryptophan in the fall of 1989, but waited more than five months, until March 22,
1990, before it completely banned the public sale of L-tryptophan. Id. GHB, on the other hand, was
banned from sale as a dietary supplement in a much more abrupt fashion. Id. In November of 1990,
the FDA made GHB an illegal "drug [w]ithout offering any evidence that GHB caused long-term
health problems, and without offering a shred of scientific proof that GHB was dangerous . I... Id.
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be dissipated by the mere banning of one particular supplement. The
trend of dangerous dietary supplements demonstrates that reactive "ad
hoc" determinations are insufficient to protect consumers. 80
In 1989, more than 1500 people became afflicted with the Eosino-
philia-Myalgia Syndrome ("EMS")8' after consuming the dietary sup-
plement, L-tryptophan.8 2 Of those affected, at least thirty-eight died from
the debilitating illness. 83 L-tryptophan, a synthetically-produced amino
acid,84 was widely presumed to be safe and was taken as a natural way to
aid in sleep and to help depression and premenstrual syndrome.85 The
presumption of safety on the part of consumers was due in large part to
L-tryptophan's wide availability in the market, with consumers believing
that the FDA would not allow dangerous products to enter the market.86
Responding to the epidemic, the FDA recalled and banned the sale of all
L-tryptophan. 7 After the ban, the FDA discovered that all of the injured
consumers had ingested L-tryptophan from a batch prepared by a single
manufacturer. 8
Although the cause of the EMS outbreak was apparently linked to a
single contaminated batch, serious doubts remain today about the safety
of L-tryptophan and its use as a dietary supplement.8 9 Further, while the
FDA should be commended for its quick response to the safety concerns
about L-tryptophan, the response to the EMS outbreak was prior to the
enactment of DSHEA, which divested the FDA of its power to quickly
ban supplements that appear to present an immediate danger. 90
GHB was another dietary supplement of questionable safety. 9 1 Al-
though GHB is generally chemically synthesized, GHB occurs naturally
in the human body and is present in meat, thus allowing it to fit the exist-
ing definition of a dietary ingredient.92 GHB was marketed for a wide
80. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(15)(B),
108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
81. EMS is a rare disease that causes severe muscle and joint pain, swelling in the limbs, and
fever and shortness of breath. Beisler, supra note 79, at 528.
82. Schindler, supra note 13, at 276; see also Beisler, supra note 79, at 528.
83. Schindler, supra note 13, at 276.
84. Though L-tryptophan was synthetically produced, it was regulated as a dietary ingredient
because it was an amino acid. Though it was introduced prior to DSHEA, it would have been regu-
lated as a dietary supplement under DSHEA for that same reason.
85. Beisler, supra note 79, at 528.
86. See generally id.
87. Id. at 528.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 528 ("This ban is still in effect today, and the FDA continues to allege that L-
tryptophan might cause EMS.").
90. Id.
91. Id. at 538-48.
92. Id. at 536-37.
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variety of uses, from use as a sleep aid to a muscle builder.93 However,
GHB was also being used as a "date rape drug" and, when mixed with
alcohol, caused a person to become sedentary or fall asleep. 94 Other ad-
verse reactions tied to GHB use included vomiting, dizziness, tremors,
and death.95 In late 1990, the FDA took swift action to remove GHB
from the market; 96 however, this prompt removal was also prior to the
enactment of DSHEA.97
Although few dietary supplements of questionable safety have ap-
peared since the passage of DSHEA, dangerous new supplements will
appear. 98 The money to be made in the industry and the lessons of history
assure that more products will be developed, many of which will be
beneficial. Some of those supplements, however, will likely cause agony
and grief to countless individuals long before the FDA can respond-
unless such supplements are prevented from entering the market.
III. THE STATUS Quo AND THE RESULTING INJURIES TO CONSUMERS
A. Ephedra's Harms
While there are other uses for ephedra, 99 it was most commonly
found in dietary supplements that were marketed to encourage weight-
loss or enhance athletic performance. 00 Although ephedra is a naturally
93. Id. at 539-40.
94. Id. at 540.
95. Id. at 541.
96. Despite its potential for side effects, GHB has found its place among regulated drugs and is
quite beneficial when used under the supervision of a physician. See 27 P&T J. 427, 427 (2002),
available at http://www.ptcommunity.com/ptjoumal/fulltext/27/9/PTJ2709427.pdf (last visited Nov.
18, 2004).
Xyrem, manufactured by Orphan Medical, has been approved for treating patients with
narcolepsy who have episodes of cataplexy, a sudden loss of muscular control and weak-
ness, usually triggered by emotions. The drug's active ingredient is sodium oxybate, also
known as gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB). Because of the abuse of GHB-it is used rec-
reationally and in date rapes-distribution will be tightly controlled.
Id.
97. Beisler, supra note 79, at 536-42. There remains a substantial amount of controversy as to
whether the FDA's decision to ban GHB was based on adequate scientific data. Many in the medical
field consider GHB to be one of the most versatile ingredients in treating many different ailments. It
is also considered to be safe and free from any significant side effects by a majority of researchers.
98. Schindler, supra note 13, at 272 ("The FDA's haphazard regulation of dietary supplements
has left an open door through which manufacturers can send untested products. With dietary sup-
plements such as melatonin, which claims to help you sleep, and DHEA, which claims to restore
youth, product introduction without any assurance of safety, not to mention efficacy, is sharply on
the rise." (internal citations omitted)).
99. Jody L. Aaron, Death Over-the-Counter: Dangers of Ephedrine, 33 DEC. TRIAL 61, 61
(1997) (ephedra used in traditional Chinese medicine as a cough suppressant, an arthritis treatment,
and for many other uses).
100. Id.
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occurring substance found in the ma huang plant, it is refined by supple-
ment manufacturers to levels that could never be found in nature.' 0'
Ephedra is, pharmacologically, very similar to ephedrine, which is the
active ingredient in many prescription and over-the-counter deconges-
tants and cold suppressants. 0 2 Ephedrine is also the ingredient that is
extracted from cold medicines in order to make methamphetamine10 3
Both ephedra and ephedrine are vasoconstrictors, which means that they
constrict blood vessels in most consumers of the products. When blood
vessels are constricted, blood pressure rises, and the likelihood of a
stroke or heart attack increases.' 0 4
On February 17, 2003, the dangers of a loosely regulated supple-
ment industry became clearer to the public than ever before when a 23-
year-old pitcher for the Baltimore Orioles, Steve Bechler, died at spring
training.105 Bechler died on top of the pitcher's mound; his cause of death
was heatstroke linked to the use of ephedra.10 6 The Bechler tragedy
caught the public's attention, not only because Bechler was an athlete
and a public figure in his physical prime dying in a suspicious way, but
because another top athlete died under similar circumstances just a year
and a half earlier. 0 7 In August 2001, Korey Stringer, a Minnesota Vi-
kings football player, also died of heatstroke in training camp. 0 8 Al-
though a bottle of Ripped Fuel, a dietary supplement containing ephedra,
was found in his locker, it was not known with certainty whether he had
actually consumed any ephedra.' 9 In Bechler's case it was known with
certainty that he had consumed ephedra.° With two high profile deaths
in the professional sports world linked to ephedra, this appeared to be
much more than an isolated problem."'
101. See Tod L. Stewart, Getting High With a Little Help From the Feds: Federal Regulation
of Herbal Stimulants, 6 J. PHARMACY & L. 101, 101-03 (1997).
102. ld. at 102.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 103.
105. Paul G. Shekelle et al., Preponderance of Evidence: Judging What to Do About Ephedra,
27 RAND REVIEW 16 (2003), available at http://rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/
spring2003/evidence.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
106. Id.
107. See Donald T. Meier, Note, Primary Assumption of Risk and Duty in Football Indirect
Injury Cases: A Legal Workout from the Tragedies on the Training Ground for American Values, 2
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 80, 92 (2002) (discussing the speculation that intensive efforts and the use
of supplements caused Stringer's death).
108. Id. at 91.
109. Id. (stating "[a]n empty bottle of the supplement Ripped Fuel and an unopened bottle of
the weight-loss product Xenadrine, both of which contain ephedrine, were found in Korey Stringer's
locker according to The Vikings, although Stringer's representatives say no traces of the drug were
found in his system.").
110. Shekelle et al., supra note 105, at 16-17.
III Id
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The deaths of these athletes were neither the beginning of the prob-
lem nor the end." 2 Less than two weeks after Steve Bechler's death, the
RAND Corporation completed a study reviewing more than 16,000 ad-
verse event reports." 3 The event reports revealed "two deaths, four heart
attacks, nine strokes, one seizure, and five psychiatric cases involving
ephedra in which the records appeared thorough and no other contribut-
ing factors were identified. '14 Although these numbers are not stagger-
ing, they grossly underrepresent the truth." 5
The FDA estimates that it "receives reports of less than 1 percent of
all adverse events associated with dietary supplements." ' 1 6 The report
stated, "[a]mong the factors that may contribute to the under-reporting
are that many consumers presume supplements to be safe, use these
products without the supervision of a health care professional, and may
be unaware that the FDA regulates them."' 1 7 Despite underreports of
ephedra-related injuries in the general population, injury reports by those
serving in the United States military have been much more precise."8
Between 1997 and 2001, thirty-three military personnel died as a result
of using ephedra."l9
When the public and governmental officials closely examined these
event reports and other scientific information, they saw an abstract yet
cognizable trend toward injury among those consuming ephedra. 2 0
Many of those using ephedra ended up in the hospital with side effects
ranging from upset stomach to elevated blood pressure and death.' 21 By
112. RAND CORPORATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., EPHEDRA
AND EPHEDRINE FOR WEIGHT LOSS AND ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT: CLINICAL
EFFICACY & SIDE EFFECTS (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/
pub/evidence/pdf/ephedra/ephedrapdf.zip (last visited Mar. 13, 2005) [hereinafter RAND Study]. The
RAND Corporation is a non-profit institution that conducts research and analysis for use in policy
making. RAND is a contraction of the phrase "research and development." See http://www.rand.org/
about/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
113. See id.
114. See FDA Press Release, supra note 35. See also FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note
12, at 6790 (noting that reports of deaths associated with use of ephedra was a motivating factor
behind the rule).
115. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING FOR
DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS; AN INADEQUATE SAFETY VALVE (REPORT) (Apr. 2001), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01 -00-001 80.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Rebecca Porter, Government, Health Advocates, Lawyers Challenge Safety of Weight-
Loss Supplement, 39 TRIAL 12, 16 (Jan. 2003).
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id.
121. FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12, at 6791.
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the end of 2003, when the FDA announced a ban on the drug, it could
show that ephedra had killed 155 people.
22
B. The Harms of Ephedra are Evidenced by Numerous Lawsuits
As consumers identify companies in the supplement industry who
produce harmful products, it is not surprising that many lawsuits have
been filed. 123 Such lawsuits are, under the current regulatory scheme, an
injured consumer's only redress against manufacturers that produce dan-
gerous dietary supplements. 124 These lawsuits will continue unless Con-
gress overhauls DSHEA and requires companies to prove the safety of
their products before offering them for sale.'2 5
Many of these lawsuits do not attack the safety of the dietary ingre-
dient itself; rather, injured consumers assert claims sounding in misrepre-
sentation, fraud, and inadequate warning. 126 Plaintiffs bring these claims
because, unlike products liability claims, plaintiffs need not show a
physical injury was actually caused by a dangerous dietary supplement in
order to win on misrepresentation or fraud grounds.' 27 Instead, plaintiffs
need only show that the product information on the label does not corre-
late with the contents of the product. Thus, fraud and misrepresentation
claims based on labeling are easier to prove than the products liability
claims. 128 Even so, such claims do not typically have the same financial
impact on the supplement companies as claims sounding in products li-
ability.
For example, in Delehunt v. Cytodyne Technologies, a consumer
who purchased Xenadrine RFA-1, a dietary supplement containing
ephedra, suffered an "acute psychotic break" and a seizure upon being
admitted to the hospital. 129 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit in
United States District Court in Ohio on behalf of herself and as a putative
class of plaintiffs. 30
Delehunt appears to be representative of the growing number of
cases in which plaintiffs assert narrowly construed products liability
claims, in conjunction with much broader fraud and misrepresentation
122. See id. See also H.R. 435, supra note 9; see also U.S. to Ban Ephedra Diet Supplement
over Heart Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2003, at Al.
123. Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *3.
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id. at *8.
126. Id. at *3-5. See generally Delehunt v. Cytodyne Tech., 241 F. Supp.2d 827 (S.D. Ohio
2003); McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
127. Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *3-5.
128. Id. at *4.
129. Delehunt, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
130. Id.
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claims against dietary supplement manufacturers.'31 When such products
liability claims are made, they are generally made under the guise of a
failure to warn claim.' 32 Plaintiffs tend to assert failure to warn claims to
avoid having to meet the burden of proof when showing that the product
was defectively designed or manufactured.1 33 Instead of a products liabil-
ity claim, the plaintiff in Delehunt asserted the following in her com-
plaint:
Defendant Cytodyne Technologies knew, or, in the exercise of rea-
sonable care, should have known about the risks associated with
ephedrine, but failed to provide the warning that a manufacturer ex-
ercising reasonable care would have provided concerning the risk,
in light of the likelihood that the product would cause harm of the
type suffered by Plaintiff and in light of the likely seriousness of
that harm. 134
Based on this claim, the plaintiff merely has to show that the defen-
dant knew or reasonably should have known about the risk associated
with ephedra.' 35
In McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc., four consumers of
"Metabolife 356," a dietary supplement containing ephedra, sued the
manufacturer after sustaining several strokes and a heart attack.136 Plain-
tiff's first amended complaint alleged six counts, including a claim for
the manufacturer's "negligent, reckless or wanton failure to warn of the
dangers of Metabolife 356."'137 After Metabolife's motion for summary
judgment was granted on four of the six counts, it was ultimately found
liable for products liability claims based on failure to warn and was or-
dered to pay several million dollars in actual and punitive damages to the
plaintiffs. 1 31
131. See TREATISE ON AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 89:97 (Timothy E. Travers
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003).
132. Id. See generally Kraus & Oh, supra note 10.
133. See generally Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at 2-3.
134. Delehunt, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
135. Id.
136. 193 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
137. Id.
138. Id. Following jury verdicts for the plaintiffs, the defendant moved for a remittitur of the
six separate jury verdicts on account of their excessiveness. Id. The court reduced each award to the
maximum amount constitutionally permissible. Id. Accordingly, each plaintiff could only recover
nine times their pecuniary damages in punitive damages. Id. The respective spouses of the injured
plaintiffs also sued Metabolife International, Inc., based on loss of consortium claims. See also Ar-
lene Weintraub & John Carey, Commentary: Diet Pills and Polls: A Dangerous Mix, BUS.WEEK,
Sept. 2, 2002, at 40 (noting that in September of 2002 more than 85 consumer lawsuits were pending
against Metabolife).
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So long as dangerous dietary supplements like ephedra are mar-
keted to consumers, lawsuits such as these will continue to be quite
common. 39 Unless Congress compels dietary supplement manufacturers
to produce safe products, consumers' only form of redress for serious
physical injuries will be the assertion of legal claims. 40 However, it ap-
pears that Congress will not change the law until there is enough political
or financial pressure to do so.
C. Money, Lobbying, and Getting the Supplement Industry Its Act
To better understand DSHEA and the policy that went into creating
and maintaining its present form, we should examine the politics in-
volved. Given the nature of politics, generally, there are almost always
competing interests on both sides of any given resolution. Enactment of
DSHEA was no different because politicians had, and continue to have, a
hefty monetary incentive to cooperate with the dietary supplement indus-
try. 1
4 1
On one side of the present controversy stands the injured consumer,
as well as the countless others who may join that group of injured con-
sumers. 142 On the other side of the issue is the dietary supplement indus-
try. The industry employs tens of thousands of people, both directly and
indirectly. Moreover, in the year that DSHEA was enacted, total an-
nual sales of supplements, vitamins, minerals, and herbs exceeded $4
billion. 144 Since DSHEA was passed, those sales have grown to more
than $27 billion per year. 45 Not surprisingly, those dollar figures are
only expected to grow larger in the future as the baby boomers age and
perhaps search for alternatives to Western medicine. 146
When an industry stands to expand and become more profitable,
legislation often accompanies the expansion to assist and maintain that
industry not only for the public's benefit, but also for the politicians'
benefit. 47 The public pays a heavy price for such "favorable" legisla-
139. Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *4-5.
140. See generally id.
141. See Weintraub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40.
142. See id.
143. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
ECONOMIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DIETARY SUPPLEMENT INDUSTRY FINAL REPORT (1999),
available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-comm/ds-econ5.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
144. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(12)(c),
108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
145. Senate Grills Dietary Supplement Sellers, Sept. 11, 2001, available at http://usgovinfo.
about.com/library/weekly/aa09 1101 b.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
146. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 693.
147. DSHEA itself is an example of favorable legislation enacted as a result of special interest
pressure.
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tion.148 Consumers do not have the same confidence that they once had
that the FDA is protecting them from dangerous products. 149 When Con-
gress passed DSHEA, lawmakers were willing to lose the confidence of
some consumers because of the size of the industry and the money it
generates.150 The economic benefit to society creates a strong incentive
for public officials to sustain the dietary supplement industry. 5' Al-
though the money generated by the industry does help support the na-
tional economy, not all the money generated is paid out for raw materials
and labor. 152 The dietary supplement industry has been consistently
among the top campaign contributors to lawmakers. 53 In 2000, the die-
tary supplement industry donated more than $2.3 million to various rep-
resentatives to work in their favor. 154
A notorious example of a politician who received money from a
dietary supplement company was California Governor Gray Davis. In
2000, he received a $150,000 contribution from Metabolife International
Inc. 155 The San Diego-based company was one of the largest producers
of ephedra-based dietary supplements. 156 Shortly after receiving the con-
tribution, Governor Davis vetoed state legislation that would have re-
quired better and more labeling of dietary supplement ingredients.157
Governor Davis, however, is not alone in receiving supplement in-
dustry money. Republican Senator Orrin G. Hatch from Utah has also
received substantial contributions from dietary supplement companies. 5 8
Despite having personal and financial ties with the supplement industry,
Senator Hatch has insisted that there is no conflict between his duties to
148. See Weintraub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40.
149. Id.
150. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(12)(A),
108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (stating that part of Congress' justification for DSHEA was that the "nutri-
tional supplement industry is an integral part of the economy of the United States"). See also Wein-
traub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40.
151. Weintraub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40.
152. See id.
153. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, NUTRITIONAL & DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: LONG-
TERM CONTRIBUTION TRENDS, at http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?lnd=H4600 (last
visited Nov. 17, 2004).
154. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, TOP INDUSTRIES GIVING TO MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS 2004 CYCLE (2004), at http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/mems.asp (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).
155. See Weintraub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id. See also Chuck Neubauer et al., Senator, His Son Get Boosts from Makers of Ephedra,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at Al. More money was paid to lobbying firms that employed Senator
Hatch's son Scott than was paid to Senator Hatch. Id. These lobbying firms received $1.96 million
between 1998 and 2001; of that money, more than $1 million came from clients involved with
ephedra manufacturing. Id.
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the public and his aiding the dietary supplement industry. 59 Not surpris-
ingly, it was Senator Hatch who pushed for and co-authored DSHEA
with Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, who also received $1 19,242 from the
supplement industry between 1993 and 2002. Yet it was Senator Hatch
who pushed for and co-authored DSHEA, 160 along with Senator Tom
Harkin of Iowa, who also received $119,242 from the supplement indus-
try from 1993 to 2002.161
Because of this flow of money from the supplement industry to
lawmakers, lawmakers have strong incentive to give the supplement in-
dustry what it wants. 162 If lawmakers stopped taking such contributions,
the pressure from public interest groups would then likely become too
great for Congress to ignore. 163 But even if lawmakers continue taking
contributions, public pressure itself may compel Congress to amend
DSHEA as needed to prevent dangerous dietary supplements from reach-
ing the market.' 64 In the meantime, political contributions continue to
pour into the bank accounts of those with the power to regulate the die-
tary supplement industry. 1
65
IV. WHERE THE BURDEN RESTS AND WHERE IT SHOULD REST
A. The Current Burden
As the system currently stands, the FDA can shift the burden onto
the dietary supplement industry only after the FDA has met its own bur-
den.166 The FDA can carry its burden of proof for "unreasonable risk...
159. See id.
160. See id. DSHEA did help bolster the lagging economy of Senator Hatch's home state of
Utah, which is home to many dietary supplement manufacturers and describes itself as "the Silicon
Valley of the supplements industry." Id.
161. See id. DSHEA is also sometimes referred to as the "Hatch-Harkin Act." Id.
162. See Weintraub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40.
[W]henever the FDA has requested additional funding to beef up its own system for
tracking complaints, Congress has said no. The FDA has been trying for years to obtain
safety information on Metabolife, only to be told by members of Congress to back off.
"This is a company that has a lot of friends," reports an FDA official.
Id. at 40.
163. U.S. to Ban Ephedra Diet Supplement over Heart Risk, supra note 122, at A 1.
164. See Weintraub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40.
165. See Neubauer, supra note 158, at Al.
166. FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12, at 6799, notes the following:
[B]ecause of the nature of these risks, we do not believe it appropriate to delay action un-
til further clinical studies can be conducted to evaluate the safety of dietary supplements
containing ephedrine alkaloids in the general population. We would, however, support
the conduct of clinical investigations carried out under the Investigational New Drug ...
regulations with careful screening to exclude subjects at risk and careful safety monitor-
ing during the trials that examine the safety and efficacy of ephedrine alkaloids, with or
without caffeine, as drugs such as for the treatment of obesity ....
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when a product's risks outweigh its benefits in light of the claims and
directions for use in the product's labeling or, if the labeling is silent,
under ordinary conditions of use."' 16 7 This test balances the known risk
that a supplement will harm the public against the likely benefit that the
public would receive from the supplement's availability. 68 Only when
this balancing test shows a significant or unreasonable risk to the public
may the FDA ban the supplement from the market.' 69 Once its supple-
ment has been banned, the manufacturer can rebut the FDA findings by
coming forward with evidence of safety. 170
Unfortunately, the FDA must assess the risk of a particular dietary
supplement without having the benefit of clinical studies about the die-
tary supplement's safety or efficacy performed by the supplement's
manufacturer.' 7' Moreover, it is not clear how dangerous a supplement
has to be in order to justify a ban on the supplement. 7 2 While DSHEA
seems to grant a large amount of discretion to the FDA, the extent of that
discretion is not clear.
Although few dietary supplements on the market have required
FDA attention since the passage of DSHEA, dangerous supplements can
still reach the market easily. 73 Because virtually any supplement can get
to the market, the likelihood increases that consumers will be faced with
dangerous supplements. 74 Yet because the FDA cannot ban a product
until the FDA can meet the "significant or unreasonable risk" burden, it
has little choice but to wait until the danger is apparent and only then
react. 75 Accordingly, dangerous supplements like ephedra penetrate the
market enough to kill people because the FDA's regulatory power has
been hobbled by the burden of proof placed on it by DSHEA.
B. Application of the Current Burden of Proof on Ephedra
Although many injuries have been attributed to the use of ephedra,
the scales tipped enough only recently to allow the FDA to remove
ephedra from the market. 176 The FDA took its first significant steps to-
ward a complete ban on ephedra by seeking public comment for a thirty-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Shekelle et al., supra note 105, at 17-18.
172. See generally id.; FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12, at 6788.
173. See generally Schindler, supra note 13.
174. Id. at 262.
175. Id. at 278 ("As the system stands now, the FDA must wait for a tragedy to occur and then
shoulder the burden of proving that the hazard is real.").
176. Id.
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day period in the summer of 2003.177 The agency sought comments from
health professionals, the supplement industry, and the public for any ad-
ditional data on ephedra's safety so that it could assemble the most com-
plete picture possible of the product's potential risks as a basis for further
regulatory action. 17
8
Although a public comment period is required of virtually all gov-
ernment agencies when a new rule is proposed, 179 a comment period par-
tially shifts the burden onto the public to gather information.' 80 But at the
end of the comment period the FDA believed it had finally gathered
enough empirical evidence to meet its "significant or unreasonable risk"
burden and was able to justify removing products containing ephedra
from the market.181
The final rule banning the sale of ephedra went into effect on Feb-
ruary 11, 2004, six months after Steve Bechler's death. 182 This was the
first time since the passage of DSHEA that the FDA determined that a
dietary supplement presented a "significant or unreasonable risk.' 83 Yet
well before this drawn-out decision to ban ephedra, users reacted ad-
versely to ephedra frequently enough to put health officials on notice that
the supplement posed a risk of serious injury.' 84
Now that the FDA's burden has been tested, it is clear that this bur-
den is too unmanageable to ensure the safety of dietary supplements on a
177. FDA Press Release, supra note 35.
178. See also Ephedra Hearings, supra note 1, at 235 (testimony of Mark B. McClellan M.D.,
Ph.D) ("By undertaking these regulatory actions and seeking public comments on these issues, our
intent is to give DSHEA the meaning in practice that many of its supporters say it should have, by
clarifying that public health authorities can use the standard in the law to determine whether a prod-
uct poses unreasonable, albeit uncertain, safety risks and then take appropriate regulatory or en-
forcement action."); see also Letter from W.J. "Billy Tauzin," Chairman of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, to Steven M. Goldberg, President, Starlight Int'l (Mar. 13, 2003), available
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Letters/03132003_845.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2004):
[The FDA] sought expedited public comment on: (1) new evidence on heath risks asso-
ciated with ephedra to establish an up-to-date record as quickly as possible to support
new restrictions on ephedra-containing products; (2) whether the currently available evi-
dence and medical literature indicate a "significant or unreasonable risk of illness or in-
jury" from dietary supplements containing ephedra; and (3) a new warning label on any
ephedra supplements that continue to be marketed.
Id.
179. See Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
180. See FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12, at 6792. Of the more than 48,000 com-
ments received in the comment period, most opposed a ban on dietary supplements containing
ephedra. Id.
181. See id. See also RAND Study, supra note 112.
182. FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12.
183. Id.
184. U.S. to Ban Ephedra Diet Supplement Over Heart Risk, supra note 122, at Al. By the
time the final rule banning ephedra was announced, the FDA had reports of 155 deaths of people
who took ephedra and more than 16,500 complaints. Id.
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case-by-case basis. This case-by-case approach is a retrenchment to the"ad hoc" determinations that Congress sought to do away with when it
enacted DSHEA.185 But at least the pre-DSHEA "ad hoc" determinations
were made before the product hit the market.186 To rectify this problem,
Congress should amend DSHEA and place the burden of proving dietary
supplement safety onto the dietary supplement industry.
C. Shifting the Burden Will Save Lives
The best way to protect consumers from dangerous dietary supple-
ments is for Congress to amend DSHEA by including a provision that
shifts the burden of proof onto the dietary supplement industry to prove
the safety of its dietary supplements. Only when the industry can show
that every dietary supplement on the market does not present a "signifi-
cant or unreasonable risk" can consumers rely on dietary supplements to
improve their health and well-being.
Although the FDA's current regulatory framework may, over time,
eventually pull unreasonably dangerous dietary supplements from the
market, that method is too reactive and too slow to respond to an immi-
nent crisis, given the danger involved.18 7 Instead of a slow reaction from
the FDA, Congress should require the industry to obtain advance ap-
proval for its products, just as it requires drug manufacturers to obtain
premarket approval for its products. After certain supplements gain ap-
proval, the FDA will still have power to remove any products that it later
finds to present a "significant or unreasonable risk." By shifting the bur-
den of proof onto manufacturers, dangerous dietary supplements will not
reach the market in the first place and countless lives will be saved.
V. THE STATUS QUO CANNOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT CONSUMERS
A. The FDA Cannot Guard Against Dangerous Dietary Supplements
The FDA cannot adequately protect the public against the dangers
of dietary supplements for a number of reasons. The main reason is that
the FDA is a political entity with a complex bureaucratic process that
must balance the interests of both consumers and manufacturers. But to
achieve this balance, the FDA's rulemaking process, which often en-
counters political and procedural delays, does not allow the FDA to pro-
tect the public from imminent threats. Lack of funding is another reason.
185. See FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12, at 6792.
186. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug ADMIN., FDA Statement on Street Drugs Containing
Botanical Ephedrine (Apr. 10, 1996), available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/
hhsephel .html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
187. See Schindler, supra note 13, at 278.
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The Office of Dietary Supplements, the subagency charged with making
supplement safety determinations, simply does not receive the funding to
research the safety of each and every dietary supplement. 8
8
Although the FDA found that ephedra presented a "significant or
unreasonable risk," this finding probably would not have occurred with-
out pressure from Congress. 89 On November 6, 2003, Congress entered
a resolution stating that "the Secretary of Health and Human Services
should take immediate action to remove dietary supplements containing
ephedrine alkaloids from the market."' 90 Thus, unless Congress applies
significant pressure to the FDA to restrict a particular dietary supple-
ment, the FDA will not be able to meet its burden to ban a particular die-
tary supplement. 191 But if the burden of proving supplement safety were
on the manufacturers, then Congress' political considerations would not
be involved when determining product safety. 192 Unfortunately, instead
of directly addressing the problems of supplements, the FDA takes only
incremental action towards a solution.
One example of incremental FDA action is the issuing of "strong
statements cautioning about the use of' a particular dietary supple-
ment.193 Warnings such as these are more like soft disclaimers and are
not geared to protect the public. For example, a warning may be con-
tained in a press release, mentioned for ten seconds on the nightly news,
or simply affixed to the side of the product. Few consumers actually read
the multiple warnings that come in or on the bottles of many dietary sup-
plements.
The most prominent form of FDA foot-dragging is the failure to
conduct the necessary safety studies on suspect dietary supplements.' 94
188. See COMM'N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON DIETARY
SUPPLEMENT LABELS app. B at B-2 (Nov. 1997), available at http://mentalhealth.about.
con/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://web.health.gov/dietsupp (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
189. See generally Weintraub & Carey, supra note 138, at 40; see also H.R. 435, supra note 9.
190. See H.R. 435, supra note 9.
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that-( I) the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services has authority under subsections (a) and () of section 402 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . .. to determine that dietary supplements containing
ephedrine alkaloids--(A) present a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury;
(B) pose an imminent hazard to public health or safety; or (C) contain poisonous or dele-
terious substances that may render dietary supplement injurious to health; (2) there is suf-
ficient evidence to make such a determination; and the Secretary should take immediate
action to remove dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids from the market-
place.
Id.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. FDA Press Release, supra note 35.
194. 21 U.S.C. § 342(l) (2004). The statutory language makes it discretionary for the FDA to
actually conduct the studies because there is no standard declaring when it is appropriate to scruti-
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DSHEA puts the burden of proving the safety of dietary supplement
products on the government, stating, "the United States shall bear the
burden of proof on each element to show that a dietary supplement is
adulterated."' 95 As such, the easiest way for the FDA to avoid regulating
a product is to claim that there is no compelling need for a study.1 96 Al-
though DSHEA states that the FDA can remove supplements from the
market when they present "a significant or unreasonable risk[,]' 197 it is
unclear whether this risk is after one heart palpitation or 1000 consumer
deaths. Studies would help shrink this vast and uncertain middle
ground. 198
Since its inception, congressional leaders have proposed many
changes to DSHEA that could improve the safety of dietary supple-
ments. 199 However, those ideas and proposed rules usually take many
years before becoming reality.200 There should be no room for delay
when it comes to regulating the consumption of potentially dangerous
substances. Thus, the FDA needs discretion to promptly issue safeguard-
ing rules or force the industry to prove the safety of its products before
the products reach consumers.
The FDA works slowly. Although safeguards against the suspected
dangers of ephedra were first proposed in 1997,2°1 it was not until the end
of 2003 that the FDA announced that it would ban all dietary supple-
ments containing ephedra. 20 2 In fact, ephedra was banned only after sev-
eral states20 3 and many athletic organizations, including the NFL, the
nize a specific dietary supplement. Indeed, some would argue that it is the FDA's failure to exercise
its discretion that is at the basis of the problem of regulating dietary supplements. See also Stephen
H. McNamara & A. Wes Siegner, Jr., FDA Has Substantial and Sufficient Authority to Regulate
Dietary Supplements, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 23 (2002) ("[The] FDA has ample authority to act
against supplements that do not provide the full amounts of nutrients they are labeled as providing;
yet the agency has done almost nothing to use this authority.").
195. § 342(f)(1)(d).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. FDA Press Release, supra note 35 (comments of FDA Commissioner Mark B. McClellan,
M.D., Ph.D.) ("The standard for regulating the safety of dietary supplements is largely untested...
199. Ephedra Hearings, supra note I, at 233 (testimony of Mark B. McClellan M.D., Ph.D).
200. See id. at 237.
201. Proposed Rules, 62 Fed. Reg. 30678-01 (June 4, 1997).
202. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug ADMIN., FDA Announces Plans to Prohibit Sales of
Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedra (December 30, 2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/ephedra/december2003/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
203. See Pinco & Rubin, supra note 6, at 397. Because DSHEA does not specifically preempt
state law regulating supplements, several states, including Illinois, Louisiana, and Florida, have
banned products containing ephedra.
As with the FDCA, DSHEA also does not contain any explicit preemption language.
[However], DSHEA was enacted to protect the right of access of consumers to safe die-
tary supplements. State action that limits the availability of these products runs counter to
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NCAA, and the International Olympic Committee, had already banned
the product. °4 The Department of Defense had already banned ephedrine
supplements from military commissaries worldwide because of safety
concerns.20 5 Ephedra's complete ban in 2003 would not have occurred
without the intense public scrutiny and subsequent congressional pres-
sure that resulted from the deaths of prominent athletes.
Aside from the six-year delay in the ban of ephedra, there are other
examples of rules that have been caught up in the FDA's regulatory ma-
trix. The Department of Health and Human Services has proposed that
dietary supplement manufacturers adhere to Good Manufacturing Prac-
tices ("GMP") to ensure that products meet minimum compliance stan-
dards before being released to the market. 206 While proposed adherence
to the GMP is a step in the right direction, it is, at this point, still just a
proposal.20 7 The FDA has not fully utilized its existing power by pushing
these proposed rules through the rulemaking process.
20 8
Another reason the FDA cannot adequately protect consumers is
because of underfunding. Because lack of funding from Congress keeps
the FDA from conducting the necessary studies, Congress might also
share the blame for the FDA's inability to protect consumers. 20 9 Al-
though the current state of the federal budget is problematic, Congress
should still fund such important research.
From the inception of DSHEA, Congress did not appropriate
enough funds to the newly created Office of Dietary Supplements.
210
DSHEA provided only $5 million in funding,21 1 which is insufficient for
a task involving hundreds of individual research projects. Congress actu-
ally allocated even less money to the ODS in the first few years follow-
congressional goals, and may result in the grant of preemption. In addition, such state ac-
tion also may run counter to the congressional intent of reducing regulatory barriers and
eliminating the patchwork regulatory policy for dietary substances.
Id.
204. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 602/5 (2004).
205. H.R. Res. 435, supra note 9.
206. See Proposed Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 12158 (Mar. 13, 2003). The Good Manufacturing Prac-
tices are designed to prevent inaccurate potency of the claimed ingredient, wrong ingredient, drug
contamination, variations in tablet size and color and mislabeling, among other things. The effect of
the Good Manufacturing Practices would be to establish industry-wide standards in the manufacture
and sale of dietary supplements at the manufacturing level.
207. See id.
208. McNamara & Siegner, Jr., supra note 194, at 23.
209. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION,
OVERVIEW OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.
gov/-dms/ds-oview.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) ("In that FDA has limited resources to analyze
the composition of food products, including dietary supplements, it focuses these resources first on
public health emergencies and products that may have caused injury or illness.").
210. See COMM'N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, supra note 188, at 66.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 287c-1 1(e) (2004).
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ing the subagency's creation. 2 12 However, in the new millennium, the
budget of the ODS has gone up significantly: In 2003 Congress allocated
it just under $20 million.213
Although such an increase helps conduct research on dietary sup-
plements, it is far from enough. If the ODS is to try to make the same
kinds of safety determinations for supplements that drug giants make for
their products, the ODS will need far more resources than Congress is
currently willing to give.2 14
Dangerous supplements will continue to enter the marketplace
unless either the supplement industry stops giving political contributions
to public officials or the public puts enough pressure on Congress to
amend DSHEA to let the FDA effectively regulate the supplement indus-
try.
B. Tort Law Cannot Guard Against Dangerous
Dietary Supplements
Because the FDA is not able to conduct safety tests on many dietary
supplements, unsafe products will not be removed from the market until
someone other than the government proves them dangerous. Most of the
public has no incentive to prove the danger of a particular supplement.
For injured consumers and the plaintiffs' personal injury bar, however,
such an incentive does exist. 215 The injured consumer's incentive is com-
pensation for past injuries; for the plaintiffs attorney, it is a fair share of
the damages and a chance at a punitive award.
When consumers get injured, not only is there an incentive to prove
the danger of a particular supplement, but a lightened burden of proof, as
compared to the FDA's burden. The FDA must prove that a dietary sup-
plement presents an "unreasonable risk" to the public,21 6 but an injured
plaintiff need only prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the
212. The Food and Drug Law Institute's 45th Annual Educational Conference, 57 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 227, 229 (2002) (Senator Hatch described the FDA as "woefully underfunded").
213. OFFICE OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR THE OFFICE OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: 2004-2009 (Jan. 28, 2004), available at
http://ods.od.nih.gov/pubs/SPI OB.Web.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
214. Shifting the burden onto the supplement manufacturers would prove to be very costly for
them. Although it is still difficult to discern the exact costs, studies on the safety and efficacy of
dietary supplements would likely involve several years, thousands of people, and millions of dollars.
Even so, the safety and efficacy of many dietary supplements has already been researched and
proven and would not need to be repeated. Therefore, it does not seem likely that average cost of
researching the safety of dietary supplements would even approach the costs associated with bring-
ing a drug to market.
215. Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *1 ("As complaints mount, even seemingly modest prob-
lems can trigger the appetite of the ever-hungry plaintiffs' bar for new and relatively untapped litiga-
tion targets.").
216. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (2004).
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product caused a specific injury. Nor does the plaintiff need to factor in
large-scale statistics gathered from a heterogeneous sample.21 7 Accord-
ingly, with a lighter burden," 8 many plaintiffs have been recovering
damages for injuries sustained as a result of harmful dietary supple-
ments.2 19
While plaintiffs have an easier task in proving their cases, they still
face the challenge of a lack of empirical proof of the danger of particular
dietary supplements, as discussed above. 220 However, such a lack of
proof does not present the same obstacle that it does to the FDA.22' In
plaintiffs' cases, proving that a particular supplement was the cause of
harm is not an insurmountable task 222 because physicians, coroners and
other experts are generally able to make a determination that consump-
tion of a specific dietary supplement caused an injury.223 As the court in
McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc. noted, "an expert is required to
prove causation in this case, as the interplay between ephedrine, caffeine,
and the other ingredients in Metabolife 356, the varying states of pre-
existing ill-health of Plaintiffs, and their various ultimate injuries is'complex and technical in nature."' 224 Because experts often have such
intricate and specific knowledge that can be used to show causation,225
plaintiffs prevail more easily than the FDA can.
The FDA, on the other hand, must prove the danger of a particular
dietary supplement where the danger is not readily apparent, and where
experts may not be able to establish causation between the dietary sup-
217. Id.
218. See Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *3.
219. Id. More often than not, lawsuits against dietary supplement manufactures are settled long
before a jury is even selected. Id. Because settlements are generally not made public, little informa-
tion is available about how such claims are resolved. Id.
220. See supra Part III.B. See also Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *4-5 ("[E]ven complete
compliance with all applicable FDA regulations does not necessarily insulate manufacturers from
plaintiffs' claims. Recent cases suggest that FDA regulations set minimum standards; while regula-
tory compliance is admissible, it is not conclusive of the issue of due care. Although jurisdictional
trends differ, dietary supplement manufacturers should be aware that there is room for common-law
claims despite compliance with FDA regulations." (internal citations omitted)).
221. See generally id.
222. Id. at *3.
223. See generally id.
224. McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (quoting McPhail v. Mitsu-
bishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313 (S.D. Ala. 1997)).
225. See Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *3.
Because exclusion of an expert may mean the end of a plaintiff's claims, Daubert hear-
ings can be the forum for the real "trial," and drug manufacturer defendants have taken
advantage of this whenever possible. Supplement manufacturers should do so as well.
Since the data on herbal remedies in peer-reviewed medical journals is far less available
than for traditional pharmaceutical products, plaintiffs have a large hurdle when it comes
to meeting the criteria under Daubert.
Id. (citations omitted)
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plement and the resulting injury. 226 Doctors and statisticians working for
the FDA can look at data of documented injuries, yet still not be able to
demonstrate an "unreasonable risk. 2 27 Those same doctors and statisti-
cians, if working for plaintiffs, would only have to show that a plaintiff's
harm was caused by a specific supplement in order for the plaintiff to
win the case.228 Thus, it is far more difficult for the FDA to prove causa-
tion than it is for a plaintiff.229
The difference between the plaintiffs burden of proving specific
causation and the FDA's burden of proving general causation is illus-
trated in Kemp v. Metabolife ° In that case, a group of injured plaintiffs
charged the supplement company with having "violated the Louisiana
Products Liability Act by failing to warn the plaintiffs of an unreasona-
bly dangerous condition of their product, Metabolife 356-namely, the
presence of ephedra in Metabolife 356. ' '231 Rather than trying to show
specific causation between their ingestion of the dietary supplement and
the subsequent injuries, 232 the plaintiffs instead asserted that Metabolife
356 was dangerous per se because the Louisiana Products Liability Act
bans the sale of such products in Louisiana.233 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' claims, stating that although "[a] violation of a statute may
give rise to negligence per se .. . it cannot serve to establish causa-
tion.''234 The court further clarified by stating the following:
Proof of causation has two components, general and specific.
General causation deals with whether the substance at issue can
cause diseases or disorders in people in general. Specific causation
focuses upon whether the substance was in fact the cause of the
ailments or symptoms in the particular patient. An inability to estab-
lish specific causation is fatal to Plaintiffs claim.235
Thus, the difference between the causation standard borne by the
FDA and that borne by plaintiffs is that the FDA must prove general cau-
sation, whereas plaintiffs only need to prove specific causation.236
226. See generally id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Civ.A 00-3513, 2003 WL 22326560, at *I (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2003).
231. Id.
232. Id. at *2.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1164 (E.D. La. 1997)).
236. See id. See also FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12, at 6822.
[T]here is no requirement that there be evidence conclusively demonstrating causation of
actual harm in specific individuals. In our evaluation of "significant or unreasonable
risk," we can consider any relevant evidence, including scientific data about the toxico-
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Despite the lower threshold of causation for plaintiffs, class action
suits might not be suited for ephedra litigation because of the difficulty
of proving that common circumstances existed across a broad spectrum
of injured dietary supplement users.2 37 Plaintiffs have thus found it diffi-
cult to obtain class status for class action lawsuits against the manufac-
turers of allegedly unsafe dietary supplements. 238 Nonetheless, the large
number of plaintiffs' claims surrounding ephedra probably buttressed the
FDA's position that the supplement presented a "significant or unreason-
able risk of illness or injury" when, in December of 2003, the FDA an-
nounced the ban on sales of ephedra. 239
Ongoing tort reform, particularly reforms that limit or outlaw puni-
tive damages, also hampers using the tort system to keep ephedra from
240the market. Many states have legislated against or limited punitive
damages in tort cases as a way to control rising health care costs. 24 1 Such
a strategy, however, seems to work against the very purpose of punitive
damages: Punitive damages were created to deter a party from its egre-
gious conduct.242 With no punitive damages in many states, the ability of
the public to regulate the dietary supplement industry through the tort
system is seriously crippled. In states with punitive damages, it may be
more cost effective for a liable supplement manufacturer to pay the ac-
tual damages up front than it would be to battle in court and risk owing
punitive damages.243 This tactic not only allows the manufacturer to con-
tinue producing and selling the drug, but also shields the issue from the
influential public eye.
Even if the problems of litigating personal injury claims caused by
dietary supplements were suddenly to disappear, litigation is still not an
effective check on the industry for many of the same reasons that the
FDA, with its current framework, is not an effective check on the indus-
logical properties of a dietary ingredient or its mechanisms of action .... The Govern-
ment's burden of proof for "significant or unreasonable risk" can be met with any sci-
ence-based evidence of risk, without the need to prove that the substance has actually
caused harm in particular cases.
Id.
237. Kemp v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. Civ.A 00-3513, 2003 WL 22326560, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct.
7, 2003); see also Kraus & Oh, supra note 10, at *6.
238. See generally Kraus & Oh, supra note 10.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of the Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1769 (1996).
242. Punitive damages are "damages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defen-
dant acted w/recklessness, malice or deceit; such damages which are intended to punish, and thereby
deter blameworthy conduct, are generally not recoverable for breach of conduct." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 390 (8th ed. 2004).
243. Note, supra note 241, at 1780.
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try.244 Because litigating individual claims only works retrospectively, it
is an inefficient means of preventing future harm to the public.2 45 Thus,
while the FDA's action and cases won by injured plaintiffs may eventu-
ally move dangerous dietary supplements from the market, these solu-
tions do not protect the public immediately. 246 Congress alone wields the
power to prospectively protect the public against dangerous dietary sup-
plements.247 Congress alone can amend DSHEA and put the burden of
proof on the manufacturers to show that their products are safe.
VI. THE BENEFITS OF SHIFTING THE BURDEN ARE SIGNIFICANTLY
GREATER THAN THE COSTS
In enacting DSHEA, Congress sought to avoid spending vast
amounts of time and money to prove the safety of what were otherwise
safe dietary supplements. 248 Research is not always prohibitively expen-
sive. Even if Congress were to shift the burden of proving supplement
safety, it is unlikely that researching dietary supplement safety would
require the same amount of time and money as pharmaceutical research
requires.249 Less time and money is required for supplements because the
track records of most dietary supplements are well documented. 250 Die-
tary supplements are simply variations on a few key compounds and
once the staple compounds have been researched, the time and tests re-
quired for each supplement decline. By contrast, the compositions of
pharmaceuticals differ significantly. Shifting the burden of proof back
onto the dietary supplement companies is not only smart and sensible,
but is also the only way for Congress to remain consistent with the origi-
nal purpose of DSHEA.25' Congress must be held to its vow that "im-
proving the health status of United States citizens ranks at the top of the
national priorities of the Federal Government., 252
In addition to maintaining Congress's original purpose, shifting the
burden of proof has many other benefits. Primarily, another dangerous
dietary supplement will not likely enter the market. By preventing an-
other ephedra, L-tryptophan, or GHB to reach the public, many lives can
244. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Sci-
ence: Science-Based Strategies for A voiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing
Products andActivities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 931-33 (2004).
245. See generally Schindler, supra note 13.
246. See generally id.
247. See U.S. Const. art. I. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2004).
248. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(12),
(13), 108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
249. See generally Schindler, supra note 13.
250. See NIH News Release, supra note 11.
251. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 § 2(15).
252. Id.
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be saved.253 This benefit is not quantifiable and should not be sacrificed
for whatever boost the economy receives from the sales of dietary sup-
plements.
Shifting the burden of proof would also reduce the FDA's workload
while still allowing the agency to have final approval authority. While
this may create new work for the agency, the cost will likely be offset by
the reduction in costs from no longer being required to meet the burden
of proof in litigation. Instead, the cost of the research would likely be
passed on to consumers of dietary supplements.
Although shifting the burden of proof would likely slow the intro-
duction of new supplements, a manufacturer could aid in the establish-
ment of a new supplement's safety by referring to the safety of similar or
same dietary supplements. By spreading the cost of testing a particular
ingredient across many manufacturers, the price of any given supplement
would be only negligibly increased. Moreover, the ODS need not discon-
tinue operations; the ODS could continue to provide information on spe-
cific dietary supplement ingredients and their safety.254
Finally, shifting the burden would have the practical effect of
eliminating the procedural question of under what circumstances the
FDA can implement rulemaking power using the "unreasonable risk"
standard.2 5 The FDA rule banning ephedra is the first time that the stan-
dard has been used and it is also the first time that the FDA's power un-
der DSHEA has been tested.256 The FDA's rule banning ephedra has al-
ready been challenged by some in the dietary supplement industry.257
The industry's challenge was based on the argument that the FDA did
not meet its burden to show that ephedra posed an "unreasonable risk"
253. See Wolfe, supra note 52 ("Without the additional legal authority to require evidence of
safety and effectiveness for dietary supplements as a condition of continued marketing, the FDA is
still in a position of waiting until enough deaths or injuries have been caused by a specific dietary
supplement and detected by the agency before pushing for the recall.").
254. The ODS currently maintains a web site with a database of research information for virtu-
ally every dietary supplement.
255. See Crossman, supra note 3, at 640-41.
256. FDA Rule Banning Ephedra, supra note 12, at 6794 ("[W]e are articulating a standard for
unreasonable risk under [§] 402(f)(1)(A) of the act for the first time and because it is more efficient
to declare these products adulterated as a category than to remove them from the market in individ-
ual enforcement actions in which we would have to establish, for each individual product, that they
present a significant or unreasonable risk.").
257. Supplement Makers Sue FDA to Allow Sale of Low-Dose Ephedra, FDA WEEK, Aug. 20,
2004. "[T]he makers of dietary supplements that once contained low levels of the now-banned
herbal substance ephedra sued FDA Aug. 17 seeking to partially overturn the agency's ban of the
sale of ephedra-containing products to allow the sale of dietary supplements that contain low dos-
ages of ephedra." Id. The supplement makers contend that the FDA failed to meet the statutory bur-
den required to prove that dietary supplements containing small amounts of ephedra pose a risk to
consumer health. Id.
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with sufficient evidence.258 However, if Congress amends DSHEA and
places the burden of proving supplement safety onto the supplement in-
dustry, supplement manufacturers will not have grounds on which to
challenge whether or not the FDA has met its burden.
While in other situations the FDA's power is virtually uncontest-
able, DSHEA provides for de novo review when a rule is challenged in
order to determine whether or not the FDA carried its "unreasonable
risk" burden.2 59 Because of such plenary review, many argue that any
regulations that the FDA issues are not rules but mere guidelines. 260 If
Congress were instead to require pre-market approval, much of the am-
biguity would be eliminated surrounding the scope of the FDA's rule-
making power under DSHEA.26'
Finally, if the "significant or unreasonable risk" burden of proof
were shifted, identifiable changes would be minimal. The dietary sup-
plement industry would be held to the same standard as the pharmaceuti-
cal industry and it would be the industry's duty to come forward with
evidence showing that the introduction of a supplement is in the public
good. Furthermore, shifting the burden is reasonable: The drug industry
has found success and there is no reason to believe that the supplement
industry will not find the same success under an increased burden.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although DSHEA places the burden of proving dietary supplement
safety upon the FDA, the burden should be shifted to the dietary supple-
ment industry. With Congress dragging its heels on making any changes
to DSHEA, the only check on dietary supplement manufacturers is the
tort system. While it is true that in individual cases plaintiffs may have
less difficulty overcoming the burden of proof than does the FDA, this
does not adequately protect the public from injuries caused by new die-
tary supplements. The FDA will likely continue to deal with dietary sup-
plement safety on a case-by-case basis, as it did with ephedra, until the
burden of proof is shifted. The high burden that the FDA must currently
meet to remove a dangerous dietary supplement from the market means
that many people must be injured or die before a product can be banned.
Finally, the current burden shifting framework and untested "unreason-
258. Id.
259. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(l)(D) (2004) ("[Tlhe United States shall bear the burden of proof on
each element to show that a dietary supplement is adulterated. The court shall decide any issue under
this paragraph on a de novo basis.").
260. See McNamara & Siegner, Jr., supra note 194, at 23.
26 1. See id.
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able risk" standard that the FDA must meet opens the door to expensive
industry litigation of FDA decisions.
Congress must amend DSHEA and place the burden back onto the
dietary supplement industry to prove the safety of its products. Only
when every dietary supplement is proven to be safe before entering the
market will consumers know that the FDA is protecting them from dan-
gerous dietary supplements.
